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ABSTRACT 
This study examines compensation strategies formulated and 
implemented by high technology firms and their relative 
effectiveness. Based on a sample of 173 firms, empirical results 
indicate that the following pay strategies are most appropriate 
for high technology organizations: A greater emphasis on the 
individual rather than the job as the unit of analysis, sharing 
of risks between employees and the firm, an external market 
orientation, dispersed decision making authority for pay 
allocation purposes, reliance on aggregate incentives and a 
longer time orientation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Several earlier studies have shown that high technology 
firms tend to develop unique compensation strategies that are 
congruent with an organizational culture that emphasizes 
innovation (e.g., Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 19847 Welbourne, Balkin, 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1990; Martell, Carroll, & Gupta, 1992). While this 
research has provided valuable information about compensation 
practices in high technology firms, it suffers froID two major 
limitations. First, the compensation measures used are rather 
narrow, focusing primarily on pay mix and the various elements of 
the compensation package. Broader compensation strategy issues at 
a policy level, such as individual vs. job as unit of analysis, 
market positioning, time orientation and the like have not been 
examined. Second, earlier studies have tended to be descriptive, 
ignoring the relative effectiveness of various compensation 
strategies as a function of a firm's technological intensity. 
The present study is designed to fill the research gap noted 
aboye. We first provide an overview of the characteristics of 
high technology firms derived from the literature. Next, we 
postulate a series of hypotheses as to which compensation 
strategies are most appropriate for the idiosyncratic nature of 
high technology firms. Third, we test the hypotheses postulated 
in the second part of the papero To this end, we present survey 
data based on a sample of 173 firms to empirically examine which 
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compensation strategies tend to be associated with technology 
intensive firms and the relative effectiveness of those 
strategies. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 
There is a relatively large literature documenting the 
unique features of high technology organizations. These features 
may be grouped into four categories: Individual traits, 
organizational factors, environment, and strategic orientation. 
These are briefly reviewed below. 
Individual Traits 
Several authors have argued that certain employee traits 
distinguish workers in high technology firms from their 
counterparts in other companies. While as a whole the evidence 
for these reported differences is perceptual or based on 
subjective assessments by researchers, there is general agreement 
that high technology firms share a prototypical profile of the 
kind of employee that is attracted to this sector and that is 
hired by these firms. The individual characteristics most 
frequently cited include: 
o 	 A strong achievement orientation and a high drive to succeed 
(Galbraith, 1989; Galbraith & DeNoble, 1995) 
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o 	 Willingness to take risks and high tolerance for ambiguity 
(Balkin & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Some have noted that high 
technology firms tend to hire younger workers which are more 
prone to exhibit these traits (Coombs & Rosse, 1992). Key 
employees, even if working as part of the team, tend to have 
a significant impact on organizational success. It is 
frequently noted that a disproportionate share of inventions 
may be attributed to a relatively small number of employees 
(Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1990) 
o 	 There tends to be weak allegiance or loyalty of employees to 
any given firm, creating higher rates of attrition (Anderson 
& Kleingartner, 1987; Drory, 1992). 
o 	 There is a prevalence of "knowledge workers." High tech 
firms tend to have a high proportion of scientists and 
engineers who are more committed to the profession than to a 
particular firm because of occupational socialization 
(Allen, Lee, & Tushman, 1980). 
o 	 There is a high rate of technical obsolescence. In some 
areas, such as biotechnology, a scientist's skills may 
become obsolete three years or less after graduation 
(Martell et al., 1992). 
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orqanizational 
A large number of studies, mostly using a case method, have 
documented the existence of unique organizational characteristics 
associated with high technology firms. Some of the most salient 
one include: 
o 	 An eagerness to accept organizational changes, which are 
often abrupt, as a normal part of organizational routines 
(Hart & Quinn, 1992). 
o 	 Tasks are highly uncertain and tend to have a long time 
horizon (Mohrman, Morhman, & Worley, 1990). 
o 	 Fluid internal barriers creating a blending of people and 
ideas prompted by intensive interaction across disciplinary 
and functional lines (Uhl-Bien & Graen, 1992). 
o 	 Short product life cycles, seldom exceeding three years 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995). 
o 	 Research projects, as well as business plans, may have to be 
altered overnight as a result of a new product release 
(Bommer & Barton, 1995). 
o 	 Jobs are in a constant state of flux and can't be easily 
defined 	(Fryxell & Judge, 1995). 
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o 	 Lack of reliance on traditional personnel function and 
avoidance of mechanistic procedures to make human resource 
decisions (Mohrman, Mohrman, & Worley, 1990). 
o 	 Need to channel resources to R&D, the core function of the 
firm, reducing expenditures in other areas (Gomez-Mejia, 
Balkin, & Milkovich, 1990). 
o 	 A high degree of decentralization and autonomy of various 
segments of the organization to shift decision making to the 
lowest possible levels within the firm (Jelinek & 
Schonhoven, 1995). 
o 	 Basic tension resulting from two opposite forces: need to 
provide for quick response due to fast pace of change, 
evolving complexity, and varying interdependence versus the 
pressure for business predictability and control (Mohrman, 
Mohrman, & Cohen, 1994). 
o 	 Low levels of hierarchy with few bureaucratic trappings, 
requiring performance management practices that acknowledge 
uncertainty, volatility of measurement criteria, and 
reliance on professional standardsjexpertise to make ad hoc 
decisions (Maidique & Hayes, 1984). 
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o 	 Weak dependence on superiors. The performance of 
subordinates is often invisible to supervisors qiven low 
task programmability, high information asymmetries (because 
it is difficult to judge what people are doing), and lack of 
clarity in the performance clues (Mar, Newell, & Saxberg, 
1985). 
o 	 High outcome uncertainty given the difficulty of 
establishing unambiguous cause-effect linkages (Eisenhardt, 
1985). 
o 	 Long delays between time actions are taken and feedback 
received (Bentley, 1992). 
o 	 Probability that technical success will lead to commercial 
success is uncertain at best, with most patented inventions 
failing to generate sufficient revenues to cover the 
development costs (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Milkovich, 1990) 
o 	 High tolerance of failure to promote entrepreneurial 
activities within the firm (Galbraith, 1989). 
Environment 
The organizational characteristics outlined aboye tend to 
reflect the environment facing high technology firms. In fact, 
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these are often posited as adaptations to the external 
environment or as coping mechanisms(Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1994). 
The literature provides the following general depiction of this 
environment: 
o 	 A high concentration of firms in "technology centers" to 
capitalize on a common knowledge base and accessibility to 
human input necessary to foster innovation (e.g., one or 
more major research universities) (Cheng & Bozeman, 1993). 
o 	 The possibility of radical innovations being introduced by 
competitors creates a race to the market place (Ettlie & 
Penner-Hahn,· 1994). 
o 	 High environmental complexity at all levels because of many 
players jockeying for positions and precipitating sudden 
changes in the competitive landscape (e.g., strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions) (Koberg, 
Sarason, & Rosse, 1996). 
o 	 Short time frame to recapture R&D investments because 
imitation from competitors is often swift and/or 
standardization may cause prices to fall (Lapides & 
ottensmeyer, 1994). 
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o 	 High velocity of change making it difficult to engage in 
long range planning because there is rapid and discontinuous 
movement in demand, competition, and technology, such that 
information is often inaccurate, unavailable or obsolete 
(Franko, 1989). 
strateqic 
While the body of literature on the business strategies 
followed by high technology firms is rather limited, two 
characteristics stand out: 
o 	 There is a greater emphasis on "built" rather than Ilharvest" 
strategies because the competitive landscape changes too 
quickly to take advantage of a particular product/service 
for very long (Kaiser & Ross, 1994). 
o 	 There is a deliberate strategy of innovation, what has 
sometimes been described as "creative destruction" in order 
to be first to market (McCutchen & Swamidas, 1994). 
summary of Characteristics 
In summary, the literature suggests that high technology 
firms share a common set of features that distinguishes them from 
other types of organizations. six overriding themes are recurrent 
in this literature which capture the essence of high technology 
firms from a management perspective. First, these firms are 
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exposed to a high degree of risk due to uncertainty and 
unpredictability in their organizational transformation 
processes, outcomes, and environment. Second, the ability to deal 
effectively with a high velocity of internal and external change 
is critical for the relative performance or the survival of these 
firms. Third, the success of high technology firms is heavily 
dependent on the creation of knowledge and innovation, which is 
often of a radical nature. Fourth, these firms tend to rely on 
organic organizational structures, avoiding bureaucratic 
procedures that prevent quick responses to internal or external 
jolts. Fifth, the quality of information available is generally 
poor and ambiguous, so that decisions must often be made by "the 
seat of the pants." Finally, high technology firms often face 
extreme complexity at all levels because of the many variables 
which must be simultaneously taken into account by decision 
makers. These individuals are forced to make choices on the edge 
or frontiers of knowledge, with results that may not be 
accurately assessed until it is perhaps too late. 
COMPENSATION STRATEGIES THAT ARE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 
In this part of the paper, we argue that the characteristics 
of high technology firms reviewed above require a set of 
compensation strategies that facilitate the successful management 
of these firms in light of the constraints and challenges they 
face. While earlier research has shown that the compensation mix 
differs between high technology and traditional firms (Balkin & 
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Gomez-Mejia, 1984, 1987), little is known about other fundamental 
policy issues concerning compensation strategies that may have a 
direct impact on the extent to which the pay system contributes 
to the achievement of organizational objectives. Seven hypotheses 
are proposed here as to which compensation strategies are most 
likely to be utilized by high technology firms and the relative 
effectiveness of these strategies. 
Individual vs. Job as Unit of Analysis 
Job evaluation have been in use for at least 50 years to 
assess the value of different jobs to the firm and assign pay 
rates to incumbents who hold particular job titles (Milkovich & 
Newman, 1996). 
Job evaluation procedures are most appropriate for firms 
with stable technologies and environment which allow for the 
classification of predefined jobs within an organizational 
structure. As turbulence in the environment increases, and 
internal change augments accordingly, job based evaluation 
becomes more difficulty because the tasks are in a constant state 
of flux. The ambiguity, unpredictability, and complexity of the 
tasks to be accomplished forces employees to be flexible in order 
to meet new and unforeseen challenges (Masters, Tokesky, Brown, 
Atkin, & Schoenfeld, 1992). The existence of a job evaluation 
scheme which defines the duties of each individual and that 
differentially rewards employees based on the tasks assigned to 
them by virtue of the job they hold would be counterproductive in 
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this type of setting because it confines rather than expands the 
range of activities that could potentially be accomplished. 
In addition, job evaluation schemes would have a negative 
impact on the effectiveness of the pay system for high technology 
firms because knowledge workers should be rewarded for their 
contributions to innovation rather than for their position in the 
pecking order of the organizational hierarchy (Gomez-Mejia, 
Balkin, & Milkovich, 1990). Therefore, among technology intensive 
firms employees should be rewarded for their skills, knowledge, 
and ideas, with job titles and level in a predetermined 
organizational structure playing a lesser role. The following 
hypotheses are derived from the above logic: 
Hypothesis 1.1: High technology firms tend to emphasize 
the individual rather than the job as 
the unit of analysis for pay allocation 
purposes. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Individual based compensation strategies 
tend to be more effective than job based 
compensation strategies in high 
technology firms. 
Risk Sharinq 
As noted earlier, a common thread in the literature on high 
technology firms is that risk is a key distinguishing feature of 
these companies. The compensation system may help reduce some of 
the firm risk to the extent that employees share part of the 
performance uncertainty (in the form of less secure income) with 
the organization, releasing committed resources away from labor 
13 
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costs into research and development. Risk sharinq is reflected in 
four compensation strateqies that may be followed by the firm 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). These four elements of compensation 
risk are briefly d1scussed below. 
Performance versus seniority. The f1rm may reward employees 
primar1ly for the1r assessed contr1but1ons or lenqth of t1me 
within the company. Obv1ously performance carr1es more r1sk as a 
criterion than seniority because the latter is perfectly 
predictable wh1le the former is subject to var10us forms of 
uncertainty (measurement errors, biases, unforeseen events, 
etc.). 
Risk seeking Versus Risk Aversion. The firm may actively 
encourage employees to take greater risks (e.g., by funding 
projects w1th h1gh potential but also a h1gh probab1l1ty of 
fa11ure) or 1t may d1scourage r1sk by reduc1nq the utility 
ássociated with assuming more r1sk (e.g., by being heav1ly 
penalized 1f outcomes are not as favorable as expected). The 
compensation system plays a major role 1n this since pay 
represents a major consequence assoc1ated with the atta1ntment or 
lack of atta1ntment of des1red outcomes (Newman, 1988). 
Fixed Versus Variable Payo Most of the earlier empirical 
s~udies on the compensations strategies of high technology firms 
focus on this factor (e.g., Balk1n & Gomez-Mejia, 1984, 1987). 
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This refers to the extent to which pay is received in a 
predictable fashion (normally in the forro of a salary) or it is 
subject to changes overtime based on variations in some criterion 
(such as profitability). By definition fixed pay carries less 
risk to the employee than variable pay since the individual can 
IIcount on it" at defined intervals (e.g., monthly or biweekly). 
The other side of the coin is that fixed pay carries more risk to 
the firm because it commits resources ex-ante even though the 
flow of future resources to the firm is unknown. 
Market pay poliey. Firms can foster more risk sharing by 
recruiting employees at "below market" salaries (which represent 
a fixed cost), while simultaneously providing greater potential 
Ior gains in the future (such as awarding generous stock 
options). Of course, employees incur greater opportunity costs by 
accepting lower guaranteed pay than wages offered by competitors 
(which implies more income risk) yet this risk is compensated by 
higher promissory payments linked to uncertain criteria (Balkin & 
Bannister, 1993) 
The above four dimensions of pay risk forro different 
elements of a more general compensation strategy, which we will 
call risk sharing for short. We expect high technology Iirms to 
emphasize greater risk sharing with employees for three primary 
reasons. First, the unanticipated costs associated with 
uncertainty, change, lack of information, and complexity can be 
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reduced by "spreading" the burden to all members of the firme 
Second, risk sharing offers the company greater flexibility to 
redirect scarce resources and make riskier investment decisions 
because the consequences of failure are more diffused (i.e., 
amongst employees and the firm). Third, risk sharing reinforces 
an organizational culture that is consistent with the features of 
high technology firms discussed earlier. The following 
hypotheses are derived from the above arguments. 
lIypothesis 2.1: High technology firms are more likely to 
emphasize risk sharing in their 
compensation strategies. 
lIypothesis 2.2: An emphasis on risk sharing leads to 
greater pay effectiveness among high 
technology firms. 
Market Driven pay Versus Internal consistency 
This compensation strategy refers to the extent to which the 
firm pays its employees based on external comparisons vis-a-vis 
assessments ef the relative positioning of pay scales within the 
firm (Lawler, 1990). High technology firms must be very 
responsive to meet the market value of each individual because 
they are heavily dependent on the human capital of knowledge 
workers. The contributions of these employees is very uneven, and 
the market information on the quality of engineering and 
scientific personnel is widely shared within the industry (e.g., 
through patents and publications). Failure te make these 
distinctions in pay allocations may lead to the exodus of the 
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best performers who are likely to face more lucrative options 
offered by competitors. 
A compensation strategy emphasizing internal consistency or 
internal equity also tends to slow down decision making because 
this typically requires multiple committees to examine job 
analysis data, make cross-comparisons among positions and reach 
political compromises (Milkovich & Newman, 1996). However, the 
market for high technology talent tends to evolve rapidly, and 
the firm needs to respond quickly to attract critical employees 
and retain key contributors. Emphasizing internal equity while at 
the same time being responsive to market changes may lead to a 
self-destructive dialectic cycle. This is because the variance in 
pay within jobs would tend to be rather high and the organization 
may be forced to pay aboye the preset limits for each job 
defeating the purpose of trying to achieve internal consistency. 
The following hypotheses are derived from the arguments made 
aboye: 
Hypothesis 3.1: 	 High technology firms are more likely to 
emphasize external equity in their 
compensation strategies. 
Hypothesis 3.2: 	 A compensation strategy emphasizing 
external equity is more likely to be 
effective among high technology firms. 
niscretion Versus Uniformity 
Firms can choose different levels of standardization in 
their compensation policies (Lawler, 1990). At one extreme, one 
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may find 	very rigid compensation systems that allow few 
exceptions to the rules or existing norms. At the other extreme, 
one may 	 find compensation systems that provide much latitude in 
decision 	making, avoiding the uniform use of criteria and 
procedures to make pay allocations. There are two dimensions that 
!I 	 capture the relative degree of discretion or uniformity in the 
compensation system used by a firm, which are discussed below: 
!! 
;! Decentra1ization Versus Centra1ization of Decisions. This 
refers to the extent to which pay allocations are directly 
controlled by specialized functional units within the firm 
(normally a Human Resource Department at the corporate or 
business unit level) or the authority and process to make these 
decisions are deliberately spread out throughout the firm 
(Carroll, 1987, 1988). 
Degree of autonomy given to supervisors. This refers to the 
extent to which supervisors are given flexibility to make 
compensation decisions subject to budgetary constraints, enjoying 
the freedom to make judgments and create exceptions as necessary 
to deal with special circumstances (e.g., the supervisor has a 
hunch that one of his/her key contributors is interviewing with 
competing firms) (Lea & Brostorm, 1988). 
A compensation strategy that provides a greater degree of 
discretion is more likely to be appropriate for high technology 
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firms for several reasons. First, the complexity and uncertainty 
facing these firms make it difficult to reach the most reasonable 
pay allocations from a centralized location. Second, information 
asymmetries within the firm would tend to create conditions where 
centralized pay decisions are unlikely to be the most opportune 
ones. Third, knowledge workers tend to have more information 
about the contributions of their colleagues than professional 
bureaucrats or managers so that their input in these pay 
allocations (e.g., team leaders) is importante Finally, 
supervisors need to have substantial autonomy in making pay 
determinations for their subordinates because many factors should 
be considered when judging the performance and contributions of 
R&D workers (difficulty of task, integration in a team, ideas 
generated) which are difficult, if not impossible, to ponder in a 
centralized system. The next two hypotheses follow from the above 
arguments: 
Hypotbesis 4.1: 	 High technology firms are more likely to 
emphasize discretion in their 
compensation strategies. 
Hypotbesis 4.2: 	 A compensation strategy emphasizing 
discretion is more likely to be 
effective among high technology firms. 
Aqgregate Versus Individual. 
This compensation strategy refers to the unit of analysis 
used to measure employee performance. At one extreme, the firm 
may reward the individual based on his/her assessed 
contributions. At the other extreme, the firm may link financial 
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rewards to the performance of teams or larger units (e.g., 
department). An aggregate compensation strategy 1s more 
appropriate when the following conditions are present (Gomez­
Mejia & Balkin, 1992): 
o 	 The performance of the group or team may be measured more 
precisely than the contributions of each individual. 
o 	 There is a high degree of uncertainty, interdependence, and 
complexity in the tasks carried out by employees. 
o 	 The firm wishes to encourage a high degree of cohesiveness 
in the work force and foster aclimate of cooperation. 
o 	 The organization intends to promote innovation through the 
use of cross-functional teams. 
o 	 Freeriding is not a major problem as employees are 
intrinsically interested in their tasks. 
Reliance on aggregate incentives is expected to be common 
among high technology firms as these incentives are appropriate 
to the idiosyncratic characteristics of these companies discussed 
earlier. These incentives can help fuel innovation by bringing 
together disparate individuals to achieve common goals (King & 
Sethi, 1992). Freeriding should not be a significant concern 
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among high technology employees as most of these workers are 
highly educated (often with a doctorate or a post graduate 
degree). Most projects are completed by teams so that linking 
rewards to group performance fits naturally with the tasks being 
accomplished. The following hypotheses are derived from the above 
arguments. 
Hypothesis 5.1: 	 High technology firms are more likely to 
emphasize aggregate incentives in their 
compensation system. 
Hypothesis 5.2: 	 Aggregate incentives are more likely to 
be effective among high technology 
firms. 
Time Orientation 
This compensation strategy refers to the time horizon used 
to reward employees 	 (Chandler, 1993). Among high technology 
~irms, this is an important issue because the results of 
particular research 	projects may require years to be assessed, 
especially if one is to consider the commercial value of these 
projects. Some estimate that feedback concerning the relative 
success or failure of a major research effort may require as much 
as 10 years (Van Fleet et al., 1995). 
We expect that high technology firms will emphasize long­
term incentives for several reasons. First, as noted above, 
performance information becomes more accurate with time. Second, 
long-term incentives will tend to create more loyalty of 
individuals to the firm, a major challenge faced by these 
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companies. Third, long-term incentives may impose "golden 
handcuffs" on employees, making it more costly to change 
employers because of forfeited accrued gains. Some companies may 
actually place restrictions on when this long-term income may be 
received. Lastly, reliance on long-term incentives is less 
expensive to the company in the short term as these are often 
awarded in the form of promissory notes. This enables high 
technology firms to channel scarce dollars into R&D investments. 
The last set of hypotheses follows from the aboye arguments: 
Hypothesis 6.1: High technology firms are more likely to 
have a long-term orientation in their 
compensation system. 
Hypothesis 6.2: High Technology firms are more likely to 
have an effective pay system if it is 
designed with a long-term orientation. 
METHODS 
Sample 
The sample consisted of 173 firms representing 40 different 
states. Each firm had at least 500 employees, with sales revenues 
falling in the 141-500 millions dollars ayear range for most 
participating organizations. The information from each firm was 
provided by the most senior human resource director in charge of 
compensation. None of the organizations used for this study were 
"unrelated diversified" or "conglomerates" to ensure that the 
firm may be used as the unit of analysis. Additional demographic 
data about these firms is available from the authors given space 
limitations. 
22 

operationa1 Measures 
compensation strategies 
The human resource directors were asked to describe the 
compensation strategies used by their firm by responding to a set 
of items tapping each of the appropriate compensation dimensions. 
These represent a subset of items and composite scales that were 
va1idated in earlier research by Gomez-Mejia (1992) and Balkin 
and Gomez-Mejia (1990). These are shown in the Appendix for each 
of the compensation constructs hypothesized to vary according to 
the firm's technological orientation, namely individual versus 
job, risk sharing, market versus internal consistency, 
decentralization versus centralization, aggregate vs. individual, 
and time orientation. 
High Technology 
The technology intensity of each firm was measured on alto 
5 scale, with each anchor point representing a range of the 
firm's total operating expenses devoted to research and 
development activities: (1) under 5%; (2) 5-10%; (3) 11-16%; (4) 
17-22%; (5) More than 22%. 
control Variables 
six control variables were used in the study that may have 
an influence on compensation strategies and their effectiveness 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). These include: Labor costs as a 
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proportion of total costs, firm size, life cycle stage, whether 
or not the firm is owner managed, whether or not there is any 
single individual or institution outside the firm that owns %5 or 
more of the company's stock, and the industrial sector of the 
firme The variance explained by these factors on the dependent 
variables were partialled out in the analysis. 
pay Effectiveness 
pay effectiveness was measured using a five item composite 
scales validated in an earlier study by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 
(1987). The response forroat for each item ranged from (1) 
strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. The items are shown in 
the appendix. 
Analysis 
The hypotheses were tested via multiple regression. The 
first set of regressions (Table 1) examined the extent to which 
technological intensity exerted an influence on each of the 
compensation strategy dimensions, as predicted by the first part 
of each of the hypotheses. The control variables were entered 
first, and R&D intensity was entered last, with each of the 
compensation strategy dimensions representing a separate 
dependent variable. The second set of regressions (Table 2) 
tested the interaction hypothesis with pay effectiveness as the 
dependent variable. The control variables and the compensation 
strategies were entered first, with the cross-product terros for 
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R&D intensity and each of the corresponding compensation strategy 
scales entered lasto 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents a summary of the regression results with 
each of the compensation strategies as a separate dependent 
variable, and technological intensity as an independent variable, 
partialling out the control variables listed above. The 
corresponding hypothesis being tested is noted under each heading 
across the topo As can be seen in that table, the R&D intensity 
variable had a statistically significant impact on each of the 
compensation strategy measures, with the effect being greatest 
for risk sharing and market vs. internal consistency. 
The results show that the greater the R&D intensity: (1) The 
more a firm is likely to use the job as the unit of analysis [for 
this dependent variable a high score means greater reliance on 
job based criteria]¡ (2) the more risk sharing there is in the 
compensation system; (3) the more the organization utilizes the 
market as a frame of reference [for this dependent variable a 
high score means greater reliance on internal consistency]; (4) 
the more discretion exists to make pay decisions; (5) there is 
heavy reliance on aggregate incentives; and (6) there is a longer 
time orientation in the reward schema. 
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Table 2 tests the interaction hypotheses. As can be seen in 
the lower portion of the table, five of the six cross-product 
terms were found to be statistically significant (with market vs. 
internal consistency representing the only exception). The 
additional percent of variance in pay effectiveness accounted for 
by the cross-product terms ranged from a AR2 = .017 for risk 
sharing (Hypothesis 2.2) to a AR2 = .068 for job as the unit of 
analysis (Hypothesis 1.2). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study reported here indicates that high technology firms 
formulate a unique set of compensation strategies that 
distinguishes them from other companies. Furthermore, the 
compensation strategies are associated with the effectiveness of 
the pay system as a function of a firm's technological intensity. 
In other words, high technology firms adopting a certain profile 
of compensation strategies tend to have a more effective pay 
system than those that don 't. This profile is characterized by 
greater emphasis on the individual rather than the job as the 
unit of analysis, more risk sharing, an external market 
orientation, substantial discretion in making pay decisions at 
multiple points within the firm, an emphasis on aggregate 
incentives, and a longer time orientation. 
These results corroborate and extend earlier findings by 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1984, 1987) based on a sample of high 
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technology firms from "Route 128" in the Boston area. Their study 
examined how the compensation mix of high technology firms 
differs from traditional firms. They found that a higher 
proportion of variable pay tends to be more effective among high 
technology firms, particularly those that are smaller in size and 
at early stages of the life cycle. 
These pioneer studies by Balkin and Gomez-Mejia suffered 
from three major limitations that are overcome in the research 
reported here. First, the geographic area was rather restricted 
(Boston) so that imitation may have accounted for some of their 
findings. Second, broader compensation strategies were not 
considered because the focus was on the structure of the 
compensation package itself (i.e., pay mix). Third, Balkin and 
Gomez-Mejia categorized businesses into two mutually exclusive 
types: high technology versus traditional. While this dichotomy 
may be useful for comparative purposes, it is obviously an 
oversimplification of reality. The measurement approach used here 
to depict high technology is more accurate because level of 
technological intensity is assessed on a continuous scale. When 
we analyze compensation strategies of high technology firms in 
this article, we are referring to pay policies adopted by firms 
at the high end of the technology spectrum. This does not mean 
that firms with lower technological intensity do not adopt these 
types of pay strategies but that these policies are used less 
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frequently and might be less effective for them given the 
limitations, challenges, and needs they face. 
In terms of the larger human resource strategy literature, 
this study has several implications. First, compensation plays a 
major role in the implementation of a firm's strategy. That is, 
an innovation strategy or a strategic choice of becoming mora 
technology intensive is supported by a corresponding set of pay 
strategies. Second, a greater match between pay strategies and 
the firm's overall strategic thrust is related to pay 
effectiveness. This is an important issue because compensation 
represents the largest single expense item for high technology 
firms, which are labor intensive and required to hava 
specialized and highly skilled work force at premium wages. 
Third, compensation strategies are not universally effective and 
must consider the context in which they are being used. 
In concluding this article, it is important to note several 
limitations of the study that raise some challenges for future 
research. First, the pay effectiveness measure is based on an 
assessment of the human resource executives. This can be 
problematic if these executives try to justify compensation 
strategies they may have helped formulate and implemento Second, 
we only used one cognizant respondent from each firm so that it 
is possible that different perspectives may be obtained if other 
organizational members had participated in the survey (e.g., 
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union members, supervisors). Third, compensation represents only 
one area of human resource management. It is likely that other 
human resource practices also play a role in the results reported 
here, so that pay does not act in isolation. For instance, 
staffing, training and development, work flows, and performance 
evaluation may all have a singular and combined impact on pay 
effectiveness. Lastly, the percent of variance explained in the 
dependent variables is not very large, hovering around 5%. This 
suggests that other factors not considered here may exert a 
substantial influence on pay effectives. 
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Table 1 

Summary otRegl"ession Results with Compensation Strategies as Dependent Variables 

and Technological Intensity as Independent Variable, Partialing out Control Variables (N=173) 

Individual 
vs. 
job 
(Hypotheses L 1) 
B/SE Beta 
Risk-sharing 
(Hypotheses 2.1) 
BISE Beta 
Market 
vs. 
internal 
consistency 
(Hypotheses 3.1) 
B/SE ~ 
Discretion 
vs. 
uniformity 
(Hypotheses 4.1) 
BISE ~ 
Aggregate 
vs. 
individual 
(Hypotheses 5.1) 
lWE .ll!illl 
Time onentation 
(Hypothoses 6.1) 
.elSE. Bm;a 
Control Variables 
Labor costs as a proportion of total costs -.124 
(.080) 
-.124 .004 
(.063) 
.006 -.138 
(.084) 
-.020 -.035 
(.070) 
-.037 .044 
(.093) 
.038 .117 
(.079) 
.111 
Firm size .113 
(.097) 
.127 -.031 
(.076) 
-.044 .103 
(.099) 
.111 -.169* 
(.086) 
-.205 -.103 
(.111) 
-.099 -.263** 
(.094) 
-.280 
Life stage .035 
(.164) 
.022 -.054 
(.127) 
-.046 -.090 
(.167) 
-.057 -.302* 
(.145) 
-.212 .060 
(.186) 
.034 .028 
(.158) 
.017 
Owner managed .158 
(.125) 
.094 -.142 
(.099) 
-.109 .236 
(.126) 
.142 -.191 
(.106) 
-.129 -.245 
(.139) 
-.133 -.263* 
(.120) 
-.154 
External ownership -.396* 
(.169) 
-.176 .372** 
(.134) 
.213 -.250 
(.178) 
-.107 .257 
(.151) 
.123 .391* 
(.197) 
.151 .608** 
(.168) 
.213 
Industrial sector -.596 
(.778) 
-.058 -.350 
(.610) 
-.044 -.174 
(.676) 
.019 -.052 
(.572) 
-.007 -.456 
(.911) 
-.038 -.438 
(.643) 
-.049 
Predictor 
R&D Intensity (High Tech) -.199** 
(.078) 
-.222 .223*** 
(.061) 
.321 -.329*** -.362 
(.080) 
-.197** 
(.070) 
.234 .264** 
(.091) 
.254 .193** 
(.076) 
.205 
*P :s; 0.05, ** P S 0.01, *** P S 0.001 
Table 2 
Summary ofRegression Results Showing Impact of Compensation Strategies and 

Their Cross-Product Terms (Interactions) with Technological Intensity 

on Pay Effectiveness as a Dependent Variable (N=178) 

Control Variables 

Labor costs as a proportion of total costs 

Firm size 

Life stage 

Owner managed 

External ownership 

Industrial sector 

R&D intensity (High tech) 

Compensation Strategies 

Individual vs. job (Job base) 

Risk-sharing (Risk) 

l\'1arket vs. internal consistency (Consist) 

Discretion vs. uniformity (Disc) 

Aggregate vs. individual (Aggr.) 

Time orientation (Time) 

Interactions 

High tech x Job base (Hypotheses 1.2) 

High tech x Risk (Hypotheses 2.2) 

High tech x Consist (Hypotheses 3.2) 

High tech x Disc. (Hypotheses 4.2) 

High tech x Aggr. (Hypotheses 5.2) 

High tech x Time (Hypotheses 6.2) 

"'P s 0.05, "'* P S 0.01, *"'''' P S 0.001 
B/SE 
.009 
(.068) 
.031 
(.071) 
-.072 
(.116) 
-.122 
(.197) 
.229 
(.134) 
-.217 
(.478) 
.116 
(.060) 
-.015 
(.064) 
-.076 
(.044) 
.102 
(.062) 
-.056 
(.072) 
.061 
(.052) 
.026 
(.061) 
-.015 
(.064) 
.089 
(.044) 
-.030 
(.044) 
.143 
(.049) 
.127 
(.422) 
.159 
(.041) 
Dependent Variable: 
Pay Effectiveness 
Beta T á.R2 
.010 
.040 
-.056 
-.042 
.118 
-.031 
.209 
.132 
.443 
-.622 
-.622 
1.713 
·.455 
2.560"'* 
-.017 
-.091 
.120 
-.060 
.081 
.032 
·.230 
1.276 
1.640 
-.789 
1.159 
.431 
-.017 
.568 
-.115 
.902 
.824 
.983 
-4.110"''''''' 
2.012* 
-.692 
2.893** 
3.381*** 
3.821*** 
.068"''''''' 
.017* 
.001 
.036* 
.047*** 
.060*** 
Note: Regression coefficients for compensation strategies and interaction terms shown in 
table correspond to each of these variables entered one at a time after control variables were 
entered ill'st 
Appendix 

Compensation Strategies and Pay Effeetiveness Measure 
Individual vs. job 
(a) 	 We have a job-based pay system. That is, faetors within the job are 
key determinants of the amount of pay reeeived by ineumbments. 
(b) 	 We have a skill-based pay system. That is, individuals are rewarded 
in part on their mastery ofjob skills.* 
(e) 	 The job is a more important factor than an ineumbent's ability or 
performance in the determination ofpay rates in this organization. 
Heavy emphasis is plaeed on job evaluation proeedures to determine 
pay levels. 
Risk Sharing 
Performance emphasis 
(a) 	 Firm has a strong eommitment to distribute rewards based on 
eontributions to organization. 
(b) 	 There is a large pay spread between low performers and high 
performers in a given jobo 
(e) 	 An employee's seniority does not enter into pay decisions. 
Risk emphasis 
(a) 	 In this organization a portion of an employee's earnings is eontingent 
on group or organization performance goals being aehieved. 
(b) 	 We designed eompensation system so that a substantial portion of our 
eompensation eosts is variable. 
(e) 	 We believe that employees should be risk takers with some of their 
payo 
Incentives vs. fixed pay 
(a) 	 The base salary is an important part of the total eompensation 
paekage.* 
(b) 	 The base salary is high relative to .other forros of pay that an employee 
may reeeive in this organization. * 
(e) 	 The benefits are an important part ofthe total pay paekage.* 
(d) 	 The employee benefits package is very generous compared with what it 
could be.* 
(e) 	 Pay incentives such as a bonus or profit sharing are an important part 
of the eompensation strategy in this organization. 
(1) 	 Pay incentives are designed to provide a signifieant amount of an 
employee's total earnings in this organization. 
i 
i • 
i. 
I 
I 
Market Positioning 
(a) 	 Preferred position of organization's salary levels with respect to 
competitors is clearly aboye market. 
(b) 	 Preferred position of organization's benefits 
Market vs. internal eonsistency 
(a) 	 Internal pay equity is an important goal of our pay system. 
(b) 	 We try hard to aehieve comparable pay relationship across different 
parts of the organization. 
(e) 	 In our organization we give a higher priority to internal pay equity 
than we do to external market faetors. 
Discretion vs. uniformity 
Decentralization VS. centralization ofpay policies 
(a) 	 Pay poliey is not centralized in this organization. 
(b) 	 The Personnel staff in each divisionlbusiness unit has freedom to 
develop its owcompensation programs. 
(e) 	 There is a mínimum of interference from corporate headquarters with 
respect to pay decision made by line managers. 
Autonomy/ Flexibility 
(a) 	 Pay system is not highly regimented. 
(b) 	 Compensationrueture is very flexible and can be modified as needed. 
(e) 	 While general rules existo many pay decisions are "one of a kind" with 
considerable diseretion on a case by case basis. 
Aggregate vs. Individual 
Individual performance is emphasized as a basis for pay rather than group 
performance. 
Long- VS. short-term orientation 
(a) 	 The pay system has a futuristic orientation. It focuses on employee's 

attention on long-term (two or more years) goals). 

(b) 	 The pay system rewards employees for short-term aceomplishments 

during a med time period. 

Pay Effeetiveness 

Our pay policies and practiees are highly effective. 

Management is very happy with the way the eompensation system 

contributes to the achievement of overall organizational goals. 

All things considered, the compensation strategies used in our organization 

truly give shareholders "their money's worth". 

Our pay policies and practiees greatly contribute to retention, attraction. and 

motivation of employees. 

Note: Asterisk denotes that item is reverse scored. 

------------~----------------~-------------------------------------.,----.-------, 
Market Positioning 
Ca) 	 Preferred position of organization's salary levels with respect to 
eompetitors is clearly above market. 
(b) 	 Preferred position of organization's benefits 
Market VS. internal eonsisteney 
(a) 	 Internal pay equity is an important goal of our pay system. 
(b) 	 We try hard to aehieve comparable pay relationship aeross different 
parts of the organization. 
Ce) 	 In our organization we give a higher priority to internal pay equity 
than we do to external market factors. 
Discretion vs. uniformity 
Decentralization US. centralization 01pay policies 
Ca) 	 Pay policy is not eentralized in this organization. 
(b) 	 The Personnel staffin eaeh divisionlbusiness unit has freedom to 
develop its owcompensation programs. 
Ce) 	 There is a minimum ofinterference from corporate headquarters with 
respect to pay decision made by line managers. 
Autonomy I Flexibility 
(a) 	 Pay system is not highly regimented. 
(b) 	 Compensationrueture is very flexible and can be modified as needed. 
(e) 	 While general rules exist, many pay decisions are "one of a kind" with 
considerable discretion on a case by case basis. 
Aggregate vs. Individual 
Individual performance is emphasized as a basis for pay rather than group 
performance. 
Long- vs. short-term orientation 
(a) 	 The pay system has a futuristic orientation. It focuses on employee's 

attention on long-term (two or more years) goals). 

(b) 	 The pay system rewards employees for short-term aceomplishments 

during a fixed time periodo 

Pay Effectiveness 

Our pay polieies and praetiees are highly effeetive. 

Management is very happy with the way the eompensation system 

contributes to the aehievement of overall organizational goals. 

All things eonsidered, the eompensation strategies used in our organization 

truly give shareholders "their money's worth". 

Our pay policies and praetices greatly contribute to retention, attraetion, and 

motivation of employees. 

Note: Asterisk denotes that item is reverse seored. 

